Written by Gustavo Irías, Executive Director of CESPAD Download PDF here
March 10, 2024
At the close of last week, the high-profile trial against the former president of Honduras, Juan Orlando Hernández (JOH) for drug trafficking crimes, came to an end with a guilty verdict. However, it was the U.S. justice system and not the Honduran justice system that judged him. From the outset, this raises the great deficits of Honduran institutions and the way in which criminal networks have benefited from structural impunity.
The charges were conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States, conspiracy to possess firearms and destructive devices for drug trafficking, and possession of such weapons during the drug trafficking conspiracy.
This case raises a question that many are asking: why did the U.S. government act against its most important political ally in the Northern Triangle of the last 10 years?
A fact that has been demonstrated throughout history is that the United States has no friends, only interests. Not to go outside the region, in the throes of the tyranny of Anastasio Somoza he supported his overthrow (1979); he also invaded Panama (1989), capturing and transferring to the U.S. Manuel Antonio Noriega (acting president), who was tried and sentenced to a long sentence, accused of drug trafficking. Both Somoza and Noriega were important allies of the U.S. government in the Cold War era.
The geopolitical interests of the U.S
The so-called Northern Triangle (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) represents an area of geostrategic interest for the U.S. government, even more than Mexico. The “triangle” is considered to be the extension of its geographical border, very essential to its national security strategy.
However, in recent decades, after the end of the Cold War, its political control in the region has been weakening, to the point of diminishing its hegemony in the area. The outlook in recent years, at least until the end of 2021, has been as follows:
- In Guatemala, the political system has maintained its traditional autonomy from Washington, with a corrupt elite at its head, ready to avoid any change in the status quo at all costs.
- In El Salvador, Nayib Bukele’s authoritarian drift gained strength, without the State Department having been able to influence his approach to human rights.
- In Honduras, his main ally, JOH, has held the presidency of the republic, but for several years he has been designated by the Department of Justice as a “person of interest.”
- And what can we say about Nicaragua, far from any democratic norm and openly anti-American.
How do you clean up this great mess for American politics?
On the eve of Joe Biden’s inauguration (January 2021), the Wilson Center, with some influence on key decision-makers in the new administration, made public several documents, from a self-critical approach, on the lessons learned from U.S. aid in the Northern Triangle. The document on Honduras highlights three conclusions:
- “The political environment in Honduras presents arguably the most difficult challenge to U.S. interests in the Northern Triangle. This is largely due to a coup d’état in 2009, doubts about the legitimacy and fairness of the 2017 presidential election, and the U.S. government’s controversial responses to the ensuing crises, which damaged its reputation in Honduras and negatively impacted it.” Executive Summary).
- “The political situation was further complicated by the emergence of U.S. government institutions acting in a manner dissonant with President Juan Orlando Hernández. As you might expect, there is confusion among the Honduran citizenry when U.S. officials interact in a normal way with a leader identified by U.S. prosecutors as a potential co-conspirator in a drug trafficking case and someone who could face possible prosecution,” (Wilson Center. Id.).
- “As long as the divergence between foreign policy and foreign aid objectives and actions persists, the effectiveness and impact of both will be less than it could be. There are few countries where this gap – and its consequences – are more evident than in Honduras,” (Wilson Center. Id.).
These findings appear to have influenced Biden’s policy toward Honduras. For starters, pressure from Washington likely prevented JOH’s decision to go after a new presidential term in 2021. In addition, the Biden administration was very active in ensuring that the November 28, 2021, elections were free, transparent, and authentic in Honduras. To that end, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Brian Nichols visited the country from November 21 to 23.
The die was cast against JOH and, therefore, pragmatically the United States had valued and accepted the option of a change of political sign in the leadership of the Honduran state, although this implied accepting a government with a progressive orientation and strong ties with Venezuela.
Simultaneously, JOH was included in the Engel list in June 2021 as a “corrupt and undemocratic actor”; His visa was canceled, but this decision was not made public until January 2022. On January 27 of that same year, the same day as the inauguration of the new government headed by Xiomara Castro, the Department of Justice requested the extradition of Juan Orlando Hernández to the United States. Thus, was consummated the U.S. operation to get rid of an inconvenient ally and show greater coherence between the anti-corruption policy in Central America and its concrete actions in the region.
It seems to us that a key point was the confirmation by the Department of Justice and the new State Department that the network of macro-corruption facilitated by Hernández had given rise to a new elite sector that took over state power, with its own economy derived from drug trafficking activities. most significantly, with their own interests to defend and independent of the dictates that might come from Washington. Proof of this were JOH’s approaches to the isolated government of Daniel Ortega: a working visit in November 2020 and the negotiation of a treaty on the limits of the Gulf of Fonseca in October 2021.
From this point of view, JOH constituted a threat to US national security and a strong message had to be sent to the Latin American region, in the sense that the US would not tolerate elites who, by “capturing” state power, carried out illicit activities and distanced themselves from Washington’s political control.
The core of the indictment filed by the Department of Justice against Hernandez is consistent with the above:
“From at least in or about 2004, through and even in or around 2022, HERNANDEZ engaged in a corrupt and violent drug trafficking conspiracy to facilitate the importation of tons of cocaine into the United States (…) As part of that conspiracy, JUAN ORLANDO HERNÁNDEZ, alias “JOH,” the defendant, received millions of dollars from multiple drug trafficking organizations in Honduras, Mexico, and elsewhere (…) used those drug trafficking proceeds to enrich himself, finance his political campaigns, and commit electoral fraud, including in connection with the 2013 and 2017 Honduran presidential elections. In return, HERNÁNDEZ protected drug traffickers (…), from investigation, arrest and extradition; caused confidential law enforcement and military information to be provided to drug traffickers to aid their criminal activities; caused confidential law enforcement and military information to be provided to drug traffickers to aid their criminal activities; used members of the Honduran National Police and military to protect drug shipments in Honduras; and allowed brutal violence to be committed without consequence” (NYC Court Case File, ContraCorriente).
Like the Mission to Support the Fight against Corruption and Impunity (MACCIH), the investigations of the U.S. Department of Justice revealed how criminal networks captured the State, that is, the entire institutionality, to use political power for the development of their illicit and criminal activities. Of course, this accusation ignores the responsibility of two US administrations (Obama and Trump) that supported an autocrat like JOH and his political party, maintaining an erratic and incoherent policy in their pretended fight against corruption and drugs.
The implications of JOH’s trial and ruling may be significant in Honduran politics (we will see later), but, for the moment, it is worth asking: after the ruling against JOH, is the US in a better position to re-establish its political hegemony in the subregion? the promotion of a new right?
The impact on the Honduran political system
This impact may be relevant in the face of the next general election. In addition, other lawsuits are pending in the U.S. courts, among the most important are those referring to the former Liberal deputy, Midence Oqueli, and the former nationalist mayor, Arnaldo Urbina. Several politicians were mentioned in JOH’s trial, belonging to the three main political parties, but there is no public information that shows whether there are open investigations or that they are already “persons of interest” of the U.S. justice system. However, the signs point in different directions of the political system.
On the other hand, in the context of the trial, the National Party was pressured to agree on a governability agreement in the National Congress (CN). This agreement left the Attorney General, Johel Zelaya, appointed by the Permanent Commission of the CN, at the head of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, at the time strongly questioned by the National Party and the Liberal Party. This situation has created fissures in both the National Party, the Liberal Party, and the ruling Libertad y Refundación (LIBRE) party, however, it is still too early to determine its political consequences on the internal dynamics of these parties and the electoral contest in general.
From JOH’s party leadership, it could be assumed that this trial would have direct implications for the National Party, deepening its moral and leadership crisis. That’s probably the case, especially if he doesn’t distance himself from his legacy and engage in public self-criticism. However, the effects on party politics will not be automatic, there are many imponderables. For that matter, two days after the New York jury’s verdict, in the emblematic election of the Honduran Bar Association, the slate linked to the National Party and the large business sector was victorious; the slate promoted by the governing party was defeated. A difficult question to decipher, at this time, is whether the judicial conviction against JOH will have a significant impact on the independent electorate (without a political party), which is the actor that determines the results of the Honduran elections.
What can be done to rebuild the rule of law and democracy?
It is a fact that the narco-dictatorship destroyed the rule of law and democracy or, rather, brought to its most precarious level the historic Honduran patrimonial state, in which private and group interests have been above the interests of society. The narco-dictatorship concentrated power to extreme degrees, around the National Defense and Security Council. Meanwhile, the judiciary and the Public Prosecutor’s Office were subordinated to the interests and whims of the autocrat. Democracy, and electoral consultations became a fiction; The overwhelming illicit financing with public funds and drug trafficking turned the elections into events that distorted the will of the voters, transforming them into unfair competitions, without transparency and legitimacy.
In this sense, rebuilding the rule of law and democracy will only be possible if the factors that sustained the narco-dictatorship are dismantled. At least five types of institutional reforms and/or readjustments are needed in the short term:
The first. Repeal the National Defense and Security Council, an instrument that concentrates all the powers of the State, which became the “main nucleus” of the narco-dictatorship. Its dissolution would be the starting point for the independence and complementarity of the different powers of the State and the re-establishment of their republican character, as established by the Constitution of the Republic.
The second. The restructuring of the Public Prosecutor’s Office (MP) to ensure that it has the necessary capacities to prosecute crime, especially organized crime and macro-corruption. Of utmost importance in this restructuring is the reform of the Public Prosecutor’s Law, referring to the Citizens’ Council and the organizations that make it up, ensuring the participation of the social sectors historically excluded and criminalized. In this way, the culture and practice of structural impunity can begin to be broken.
The third. Ensure the independence of the Judiciary in accordance with international standards, through actions that also involve its internal restructuring. A factor facilitating impunity and blocking access to justice has been the judiciary (i.e., the courts of justice). A substantially different performance would be that it does not continue to accumulate resolutions that impede access to justice, for example, the amparo appeals in the case of Berta Cáceres, the corruption cases inherited from the MACCIH, the historical debt with the Garifuna people, with women, with children and with the LGTBQ+ community, among others.
The fourth. The reform of the legal framework that regulates electoral political financing, dismantling the blockade that exists on citizens’ access to information from private natural and legal contributors to electoral campaigns. Likewise, it is essential to strengthen the institutional framework of the Clean Policy Unit with autonomy, more budget, and the necessary technical capacities. Along the same lines, it would be necessary to have a regulatory framework and, especially, the political will of the parties for the self-purification of their candidates, ensuring ethics and integrity.
The fifth. The purging and reform of the police and military forces. Various reports by the U.S. Department of Justice repeatedly mention the involvement of police and military officials in the commission of drug-related crimes. For several decades, the police have been subjected to a permanent and ineffective police purge, but it has not been possible to achieve a substantial police reform that would make them an effective force in the fight against crime and respectful of human rights.
However, for these reforms to move forward, the current government must have the political support of civil society organizations and social movements, which implies a greater openness to the civic-democratic space, in other words, dialogue, agreements and coordination of actions between the government and social organizations. Equally, greater access to public information and accountability of the organizations that make up the justice system, the police and the armed forces is essential.